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The Future of the Grave Breaches Regime:
Segregate, Assimilate or Abandon?
James G. Stewart*

Abstract
The grave breaches regime has three possible futures. In the first, the regime remains segregated
from other categories of war crimes in deference to the historical development of these crimes.
This future, however, is one that will see a relatively dramatic decline in the use of grave breaches
in practice, primarily because other offences cover the same acts more efficiently. In the second
possible future, the grave breaches are entirely abandoned, but this eventuality seems both
improbable and undesirable. Even though judicial pragmatism has diminished aspects of the grave
breaches regime that were once unique, grave breaches still offer important features over and
above all alternatives. The grave breaches regime is therefore unlikely to disappear entirely. A
third possible future involves assimilating the grave breaches with other categories of war crimes,
ideally through the promulgation of a more coherent treaty regime. In the short term, this
proposition appears politically untenable, leaving judges to unify the stark disparities between
grave breaches and other war crimes. A future that continues to adopt this course will nonetheless
pose serious problems for the discipline in the years to come. Over the longer term, a treaty
creating a more comprehensive code governing all war crimes is therefore inevitable.

1. Introduction
In August 1949, states stunned by a second world war in less than half a century signed four
conventions that signaled a veritable revolution for the concept of war crimes. At the end of each
of the four Geneva Conventions, three provisions not only designated certain violations of the laws
of war as ‘grave breaches’, they also took the unprecedented step of compelling states to pass
criminal legislation implementing these breaches into domestic criminal law and obliging
signatories to search for and prosecute those responsible ‘regardless of their nationality.’ Relative
to earlier notions of war crimes, the grave breaches regime was nothing short of a ‘quantum leap’.1
*
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War crimes were prosecuted and punished at Nuremberg and before, but the grave breaches regime
enjoyed the distinction of being the first treaty codifying war crimes. It represented a bold
determination that the world would no longer tolerate the travesty of sham trials at Leipzig after
World War One (WWI),2 nor hear arguments that post-war justice administered at Nuremberg or
Tokyo amounted to little more than novel law selectively visited on a vanquished enemy.3 From
now on, war criminals would be sought everywhere, called to answer to national courts, and
dispassionately punished in accordance with pre-existing law.
None of these ambitions were quickly realized. For the better part of a century, the grave
breaches regime was not just imperfect, it remained totally inoperative. Several decades after grave
breaches were formally adopted, one author explained that ‘[t]he reasons why there have been no
prosecutions for ‘grave breaches’ are partly technical, born of the legal complexities and
uncertainties in the Geneva Conventions, but more substantially, they lie in the area of
international politics and the hard facts of military situations.’4 On the political side of this
equation, fear of retribution against nationals detained by the adversary prevented belligerent states
from initiating war crimes proceedings against enemies in their custody,5 and the agenda of third
states was generally circumscribed by allegiance to competing superpowers.6 On a technical level,
the Geneva Conventions had failed to define grave breaches with any meaningful degree of
precision, such that states had little assistance in navigating an often complex set of rules that must
be interpreted to prosecute grave breaches. Arguably, this was intentional. The Geneva
Conventions themselves furnished ‘only keywords to designate a criminal act, nothing which can
be called a definition,’7 thereby leaving a range of indispensable criminal concepts ‘under a cloud
of obscurity.’8 Despite the lofty promise of justice, the grave breaches regime was stymied from
the outset.
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At the end of the Cold War, courts finally breathed life into a grave breaches regime that
had earlier appeared little more than a ‘dead letter’.9 The rise of a hegemonic global order enabled
the establishment of various international criminal courts and tribunals, which in turn stimulated
domestic appetite for war crimes prosecutions. This process was not foreseen at the time the
Geneva Conventions were signed—during the negotiation of the grave breaches regime, states
elected to simply list the names of the various grave breaches on the understanding that ‘[t]he
Conference is not making international penal law but is undertaking to insert in the national penal
laws certain acts enumerated as grave breaches of the Convention, which will become crimes when
they have been inserted in the national penal laws’.10 But by the turn of the new millennium,
international courts and not their domestic counterparts had taken the lead in interpreting, defining
and applying almost the full panoply of grave breaches as listed in the Geneva Conventions, from
unlawful confinement of civilians to deportation from occupied territory.11 As a consequence, the
grave breaches regime is now complemented by a prodigious body of jurisprudence derived in
large part from international courts, even though those assembled at Geneva anticipated that
domestic courts would fulfill this function much sooner. Predicting the future of the grave breaches
regime is no easier now.
Nonetheless, this article assesses three possible futures for the grave beaches regime in
light of current developments within the discipline. The first of these supposes the continued
segregation of the grave breaches regime from other categories of war crimes in accordance with
the historical development of the laws of war. As the first section of this article shows, a future of
this sort accords with the current state of the law, but it inevitably leads to seriously diminished
use of the grave breaches regime in practice. The second possible future involves abandoning the
grave breaches regime as pragmatic changes in customary law governing other wartime offences
and more recent developments in international criminal justice threaten to supersede the grave
breaches regime. To a certain extent, this future is already upon us. The third and final possible
future involves an assimilation of the various categories of war crimes into a single, coherent and
comprehensive body of law governing wartime criminality. In essence, this future involves
rewriting war crimes afresh. As the negotiators to the Geneva Conventions would now testify,
which of these futures will ultimately prevail is impossible to predict. Nevertheless, we can be sure
that the future of the grave breaches regime will represent a tension between the historical origins
of the crimes, pragmatic attempts at overcoming the formal technicalities that attach to these
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offences and an ongoing quest for greater coherence within the law governing war crimes
generally.

2. The Continued Segregation of the Grave Breaches Regime
Grave breaches are but one species of war crimes. The first and older category of offences were
known as ‘violations of the laws and customs of war.’ Prior to the inception of the grave breaches
regime, the term violations of the laws and customs of war referred to the laws of war generally,12
but the idea that violations of certain of these rules constituted criminal offences derived from
custom. As a result, customary law formed the legal basis for ‘violations of the laws and customs
of war’ charged after WWI,13 and again inspired the charters of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals a matter of decades later.14 In the wake of World War Two (WWII), however, the grave
breaches regime promulgated a separate but overlapping series of treaty-based war crimes, thereby
creating a second category of wartime criminality. Two categories of war crimes then became
three when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) declared that
violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II constitute
a separate class of war crime applicable in international and non-international armed conflict
alike.15 Then finally, to complete a relatively sophisticated legal kaleidoscope, treaties governing
specific aspects of wartime conduct, such as the protection of cultural property, created a fourth
category of war crimes.16 A future that maintains these categories represents a continuation of the
status quo, where groups of war crimes are segregated from one another.
This segregation stems from history. At each stage in the development of war crimes, states
simply added layer upon layer of new law without repealing earlier overlapping or redundant
12
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equivalents. States were adamant, for instance, that the grave breaches regime in no way repudiated
the ‘violations of laws and customs of war’ punished as war crimes at Nuremberg, even though
these earlier war crimes were ‘practically all covered in the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I’17. In the same vein, states involved in the codification of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) Statute adopted the segregated, compartmentalized, and less than coherent distinction
between the various overlapping historical categories of wartime offences, perpetuating what
Meron once described as ‘a crazy quilt of norms’.18 As a consequence of this tendency to
continually add layers of law without consolidating the law into a coherent whole, grave breaches
are now but one of four disassociated categories of war crime.19 One possible future for the grave
breaches regime involves continued segregation along these historical lines. And yet, maintenance
of the current divisions between grave breaches and other war crimes will inevitably lead to a
relatively dramatic decline in the use of grave breaches.
Quite simply, other offences are easier to prove. Already, prosecutors choose to charge
acts that amount to grave breaches as domestic crimes, violations of military regulations or other
war crimes,20 partly in a bid to avoid a range of technicalities specific to the grave breaches regime.
Most importantly, grave breaches only apply during international armed conflict.21 Where crimes
that would constitute grave breaches occur in connection with direct hostilities between two
warring states, establishing the international armed conflict is unlikely to prove especially
troublesome. The torture at Abu Ghraib, for instance, was undoubtedly a grave breach. And yet a
large portion of modern armed conflicts involve so-called internationalized armed conflicts, where
foreign governments adopt domestic proxies as their military agents.22 The now prolific incidence
of these internationalized armed conflicts poses special problems for the future of the grave
breaches regime, since application of the Geneva Conventions to internationalized warfare
requires prosecutors to prove highly complex questions of fact about the relationship between rebel
groups and their foreign sponsor. In particular, a foreign state must exercise overall control over a
rebel army in order to internationalize an armed conflict, which is only established when a state
has ‘a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group’. 23 In
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a wide variety of circumstances, the difficulties associated with proving propositions of this
complexity outweigh the benefits of charging grave breaches.
For one reason, states tend to zealously conceal their role in fomenting foreign rebellion,
such that merely obtaining the proof necessary to prosecute grave breaches often borders on the
impossible. As the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo discovered during the Armed
Activities Case before the International Court of Justice, proving that the Mouvement pour le
Liberation de Congo (MLC) was under the control of the Ugandan government can be
demanding24, even when this relationship is not the subject of serious political dispute.25 The need
to prove overall control is, of course, even more onerous within criminal proceedings where higher
standards of proof apply. Moreover, the rationale for undergoing this burden is weak when overall
control is irrelevant to the moral culpability of the accused—acts of pillage, murder or rape
perpetrated by the MLC are just as reprehensive regardless of whether or not a foreign state
supports them. And yet in order to charge grave breaches in these circumstances, it is ‘necessary
to collect evidence and litigate on complex issues, such as the role of third states, when ultimately
this has no bearing on the role and liability of the perpetrator.’26 Thus, in addition to the frequently
insurmountable difficulty of obtaining the requisite proof to establish overall control, opting to
prosecute wartime offences as grave breaches creates an overriding danger that a wholly culpable
accused is acquitted, only because of a failure to establish issues as contentious as foreign control
over the perpetrators.
Grave breaches are also more politically sensitive than other war crimes, since proving an
international conflict often involves exposing the meddling of a powerful foreign state. In some
instances, doing so is politically untenable. One might fairly anticipate, for instance, that members
of the Angolan rebel group UNITA would not be charged with grave breaches on the theory that
their offences occurred within a conflict that was internationalized through American and South
African patronage during the Cold War,27 especially when other crimes allow an assessment of
culpability without implicating the rebels’ puppet-masters. One can certainly posit scenarios
whereby prosecuting grave breaches might be politically advantageous for certain powers
(prosecuting Hariri’s assailants for grave breaches as a means of exposing Syrian implication
would be one example), but in a large number of instances the political ramifications of charging
24
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rebel groups or their adversaries with grave breaches impede rather than promote accountability.
These impediments will be just as significant in the future, as increased economic interdependence
born of globalization, the development of nuclear capabilities among previously incapable states,
the greater incidence of terrorism in Western countries and the increasing scarcity of natural
resources, all provide continuing incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts.
The notion of victimhood that is specific to the grave breaches regime will also compel
prosecutors to favor simpler criminal offences over the grave breaches. One of the distinctive
characteristics of the grave breaches as originally conceived, was the division of victims between
wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war and ‘protected persons’. As a number of authors
in this edition have pointed out, the term ‘protected persons’ was never synonymous with civilians.
Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV defines protected person status based on the nationality of the
victim, the role of their home state in the surrounding hostilities and the adequacy of diplomatic
protections.28 As is well known, the ICTY interpreted this nationality requirement as implying
‘allegiances’,29 in order to ensure that the grave breaches regime still applied during
internationalized armed conflict, in which rebel perpetrators and their governmental adversaries
share the same nationality. But even on the controversial reinterpretation of protected person status
offered by the ICTY, prosecutors who prefer to charge offences as grave breaches will still be
required to tender evidence about the ‘allegiance’ of the victim, the role of their country of origin
in hostilities and whether or not they enjoyed ‘effective and satisfactory diplomatic
representation’.30 Already, the sheer extent and complexity of this law deters use of the grave
breaches regime, when comparable categories of war crime, domestic offences or military
regulations cover the same acts without requiring proof of protected person status. In the future,
prosecutors will prefer these simpler alternatives.
Debates concerning unlawful combatant status are likely to compound the comparative
disadvantage of the grave breaches regime as compared with these other overlapping criminal
offences, further undermining the value of a segregated grave breaches regime. One of the
principal concerns is that based on the United States’ (US) definition, unlawful combatants cannot
be victims of grave breaches. To recall, in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York, the US
government unveiled a status inaccurately deemed ‘unlawful combatancy’, premised on the notion
that ‘technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention [sic]’.31
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Critiques of the legal slight-of-hand that underpins this position are numerous,32 but there is less
recognition that these arguments also imply that unlawful combatants cannot be victims of grave
breaches. The logic is simple. If unlawful combatants have no rights under the Geneva
Conventions, they technically cannot be victims of the criminal offences enshrined in those
Conventions, no matter the gravity of the abuse. Thankfully, war crimes jurisprudence has
categorically refuted this reasoning,33 but prosecuting grave breaches in the future might still
require courts to engage a deeply polarized, highly technical and frequently confused debate. When
faced with this prospect, many prosecutors will look to alternative offences that avoid these
technicalities entirely.
And even absent these sorts of legal or political impediments, the added cost of proving
the technicalities associated with grave breaches further undermines the likely that acts amounting
to grave breaches will be enforced as such. International criminal justice is, after all, subject to at
times justified criticism for the unacceptable length of trials and intense pressure to minimize
spending. In both respects, the added elements specific to grave breaches create costs that a nascent
system of international justice can ill-afford. These constraints are likely to persist into the future,
leading both courts and prosecutors to frame their accusations within less onerous categories of
offence. To a certain extent, this situation is already the norm. In more than one instance, judges
at the ICTY have openly encouraged the Prosecution to withdraw grave breaches charges with
‘due regard to reducing the amount of trial time needed to address the Defence denial of the
international nature of the armed conflict’.34 As we will observe below, other war crimes are
increasingly perceived as better alternatives insofar as they avoid these technicalities. Thus, to the
extent that the grave breaches regime remains isolated from other categories of war crimes, fettered
by technicalities that are not relevant to the moral culpability of the accused, or plagued by the
unlawful combatant debarcle, it appears to face a relatively bleak future. A grave breaches regime
that remains segregated from other categories of war crime will suffer a diminished role in practice.

3. Abandoning the Grave Breaches Regime
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In another possible future, the grave breaches regime could face outright abandonment. A demise
of these proportions would not be entirely foreign to the laws of war. The grave breaches regime
might, for example, be relegated to a status vaguely reminiscent of the Protecting Powers
provisions within the same Conventions, which boldly promised that independent third states and
organizations would supervise compliance with the laws of war but ultimately fell into desuetude
after an extremely limited application in practice.35 Elements of the grave breaches regime have
already endured a similar fate. The provision within the grave breaches regime that contemplates
an enquiry procedure and appointment of an umpire to investigate grave breaches has all but
disappeared from even expert discussion,36 not to mention the inactivity of the fact-finding
Commission established by Additional Protocol I for similar purposes.37 Given the appreciable
burden of proving the technicalities associated with grave breaches, it is at least plausible that
grave breaches will again become a ‘dead letter’ in the future. And at the risk of sounding slightly
alarmist, certain current trends inevitably lead to a partial downfall of this sort.
Recent developments in the law governing other categories of war crimes supersede
aspects of the grave breaches regime. In particular, courts have extended the application of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to a point where it threatens to almost singlehandedly eclipse the grave breaches regime. Originally, common Article 3 was codified as a
‘convention within a convention’, creating a list of prohibitions one author famously described as
‘affectionate generalities’.38 Several decades later, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared
that common Article 3 formed ‘a minimum yardstick’ applicable in all armed conflicts, based
principally on the premise that these prohibitions constituted ‘elementary considerations of
humanity’.39 International criminal tribunals then embraced the same reasoning, precisely in order
to bypass the technicalities that plague the grave breaches regime. Early in the tenure of the ICTY,
the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision declared that ‘at least with respect to the minimum rules in
common Article 3, the character of the conflict is irrelevant.’40 As a result, a single provision within
the Geneva Conventions that was not originally intended to apply in international armed conflict,
let alone give rise to individual criminal responsibility, is now poised to overshadow the once
revolutionary criminal regime explicitly enshrined within the Geneva Conventions.
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The consequences for the future of the grave breaches regime are marked. Common Article
3 offers many of the benefits of grave breaches without the drawbacks. In terms of coverage, the
two categories of war crimes share important commonalities — both criminalize wilful killing and
murder, torture and inhuman treatment, hostage-taking, and unfair trial. Rape could also be
prosecuted as torture under both regimes. In other respects, however, one of the two categories of
war crimes offers distinct advantages. Whereas a grave breach presupposes proof of an
international armed conflict, the extended conception of common Article 3 simply demands
evidence of a ‘protracted armed conflict.’ By charging wartime offences as violations of Common
Article 3, courts can therefore dispense with the imprecise, convoluted, and woefully inefficient
process of qualifying international armed conflicts. Furthermore, Common Article 3 neatly
overcomes the complexity of proving protected person status by substituting a simpler assessment
of whether the victims were ‘not taking active part in hostilities.’ Quite understandably, domestic
courts and international tribunals now charge war crimes as violations of common Article 3 rather
than grave breaches as a matter of course.41 In the future, at least a portion of the grave breaches
regime is likely to be eclipsed by these practices.
Other jurisprudential developments are likely to have similar effects. Other categories of
war crimes are now considered applicable in international and non-international armed conflict
alike, which also allows courts to dispense with the need to qualify the character of the surrounding
armed conflict. Once again, the logic is compelling in its simplicity — courts reason that if the
content of war crimes is identical in both types of war, undergoing the arduous process of
characterizing the nature of the conflict is superfluous. So in the trial of Naser Orić, the accused
was charged with ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages not justified by military
necessity’, which formally derives from the Hague Regulations of 1907 and therefore international
armed conflict, but the Tribunal summarily dispensed with the need to determine the status of the
conflict by merely repeating the mantra that ‘[u]nder Article 3 of the [ICTY] Statute, it is
immaterial whether the crimes alleged in the Indictment occurred within an internal or
international armed conflict.’42 The assertion, which in this particular case remained implicit, was
that the offence shares a common legal meaning in customary international law within both species
of armed conflict. Consequently, citing the existence of the offence in the two contexts alleviated
the need to characterize the surrounding war. As a result, a future without grave breaches is not
just a fanciful hypothetical; to a certain extent it is already upon us. Why, after all, would a
prosecutor charge the grave breach of ‘extensive destruction … not justified by military necessity
41
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and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’, when the analogous offence of ‘wanton destruction of
cities, town or villages’ now achieves exactly the same ends without subjecting the prosecution to
the rigors of conflict qualification required by the grave breaches regime?
In the past, enforcement obligations unique to the grave breaches regime might have
explained a preference for prosecuting grave breaches43, but recent experience suggests that the
value of these enforcement obligations has also declined in significance. Take, for instance, the
obligation to enact legislation providing for ‘effective penal sanctions’ of grave breaches. The
received wisdom is that this obligation does not require states to criminalize grave breaches as
such — torture can be criminalized as assault, extensive appropriation not justified by military
necessity as theft and hostage taking as kidnapping. Even war crimes jurisprudence opines that
‘there is no rule, either in customary or in positive international law, which obligates States to
prosecute acts which can be characterized as war crimes solely on the basis of international
humanitarian law, completely setting aside any characterizations of their national criminal law.’44
While strong arguments of both law and policy might be leveled against this interpretation, the
exceedingly lenient reading of the obligation represents prevalent views. And even though this
obligation is so easy to satisfy, most surveys show that states have failed miserably in enacting
criminal legislation that meets even this lax standard.45 On all accounts, abandoning such a
conceptually weak and practically ineffectual obligation to enact legislation would probably not
constitute a legal calamity, especially when the markedly more effective obligations contained in
the ICC Statute compel domestic implementation of all international crimes.46
Similarly, recent developments in international criminal law at least partially overshadow
the obligation to search for and prosecute grave breaches. As Kress points out in his erudite
contribution to this symposium, the obligation to search for and prosecute grave breaches cannot
reasonably be read as absolute. In a number of situations (consider an insane perpetrator), the
obligation gives way to established criminological principles. It is presumably in response to these
types of limitations, that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s Customary Study
stipulates that ‘States must investigate war crimes … over which they have jurisdiction and, if
43
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appropriate, prosecute the suspects.’47 Regrettably, the term ‘if appropriate’ goes undefined. In
the absence of clear definition, the discretion created by the term almost dilutes the obligation to
vanishing point. We witness, for example, a plethora of extra-judicial considerations in
determining whether to initiate charges for grave breaches, some of which reflect the legitimate
concerns of a criminal justice system while others simply allow politics to hinder justice.
Moreover, the complementarity regime within the ICC Statute is likely to achieve much more.
Already the ICC’s complementarity regime has coerced British authorities into prosecuting their
own soldiers for grave breaches perpetrated in Iraq,48 thereby evidencing an arguably greater
influence on the enforcement of grave breaches within a single decade than the obligation to search
for and prosecute these crimes achieved over the course of the preceding half-century. In all these
respects, enforcement mechanisms within the grave breaches regime also face a future of declining
value.
Despite these relative declines in significance, outright abandonment remains improbable.
For one reason, certain grave breaches simply have no equivalent in other categories of war crimes.
One prime example is the grave breach of ‘unlawful confinement’, which was codified as a war
crime for the first time in the grave breaches regime, soon after the massive incidence of illicit
detention during WWII. As international criminal justice currently stands, unlawful confinement
is only an offence in inter-state armed conflict. In an attempt to bridge this arbitrary normative
divide, the Prosecution in the Limaj case argued that ‘unlawful seizure’ and ‘unlawful detention
for prolonged periods’ during the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) non-international armed
conflict with Serbian forces was subsumed within the war crime of ‘cruel treatment’.49 In
dismissing this argument, the Trial Chamber concluded that ‘at least in the circumstances of this
case, these acts in and of themselves do not amount to a serious attack on human dignity within
the meaning of cruel treatment’.50 The Tribunal’s conclusion is certainly open to substantive
critique (that unlawful confinement is a grave breach in international armed conflict is the most
blatant retort), but the decision does highlight how creative charging is sometimes necessary in an
attempt to counter the fact that certain grave breaches have no direct equivalent elsewhere in the
laws of war. Unlawful confinement is far from alone in this regard, meaning that abandoning the
grave breaches regime would result in a marked diminution of established categories of
international criminal responsibility. Certain states will surely oppose a regulatory regression of
this type.
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The mere fact that grave breaches are formally codified and universally ratified is another
reason why these war crimes will survive. As the infamous history of the US Military
Commissions Act 2006 (MCA) confirms, grave breaches are less easily manipulated than other
war crimes. In 2006, the US Congress hurriedly passed the MCA in response to the US Supreme
Court’s decision in Hamdan, which ruled that the first incarnation of military commissions
established by President Bush transgressed common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.51 After
Hamdan, the then US Administration suddenly realized that by implication they were perpetrating
war crimes — the US War Crimes Act of 1996 render violations of common Article 3 federal
crimes. Thus, in an attempt to minimize their exposure to potentially serious criminal liability, the
Administration surreptitiously used the MCA to amend the portion of the US War Crimes Act that
criminalized the relevant aspects of common Article 3.52 To feint legitimacy, the MCA created the
concept of ‘grave breaches of common Article 3’, which marked an unprecedented collapse of two
categories of war crimes that had epitomized the discipline’s segregated history.
The marriage of the two categories of war crime was not fortuitous — the novel notion of
‘grave breaches of common Article 3’ excluded precisely the components of common Article 3
that actors within the ‘war on terror’ had unquestionably violated as a matter of routine, namely
the ‘denial of the right to a fair trial’ and the prohibition against ‘outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.53 And yet strangely, Congress failed to
simultaneously amend aspects of the US War Crimes Act that also criminalize grave breaches.54
The oversight was perplexing since grave breaches not only cover precisely those aspects of
Common Article 3 that the US government repealed,55 they also criminalizes a wider array of
practices synonymous with the ‘War on Terror.’56 In short, the attempt to repeal offences the US
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Government was perpetrating was only partially achieved. One might speculate about the rationale
for this half-measure, but the explicit codification of grave breaches within the Geneva
Conventions, as opposed to the customary nature of criminal liability for violations of common
Article 3, arguably narrowed the opportunity for further legal distortion.
The explicit nature of the grave breaches regime is equally valuable in other contexts, again
highlighting grounds for resisting calls to discard grave breaches in the future. In the Basson case,
amnesties and jurisdictional barriers impeded various attempts at prosecuting a doctor who had
directed South Africa’s secret chemical and biological warfare project during the apartheid era.57
As Ferdinandusse highlights, the South African Constitutional Court made explicit reference to
the obligation to search for and prosecute in the grave breaches regime by declaring that these
barriers raised constitutional issues.58 Although Prosecutors ultimately decided not to proceed with
a retrial, the case does demonstrate how explicit wording in a universally agreed treaty contributes
to the likelihood of accountability in the face of trenchant political opposition. The lesson is
important for the future. If the history of the grave breaches regime has reaffirmed anything about
war crimes prosecutions, it is surely that we must expect the type of political resistance to
accountability epitomized by apartheid South Africa or a US government responsible for various
grave breaches at Guantánamo. As these two examples reveal, the causes and extent of a regime’s
responsibility for war crimes can be radically different from one context to the next, but the
underlying resistance to accountability is relatively predictable. The grave breaches regime,
therefore, retains important value over and above other international and domestic offences. And
if the past is any guide, every obligation capable of leveraging prosecutions will be vital in
counteracting the culture of impunity future generations will inherit.
Universal jurisdiction within the grave breaches regime is similar. As numerous authors in
this symposium have shown, the grave breaches regime contains an important provision
demanding that states party ‘enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions’
for grave breaches, and compels these same states to search for and prosecute those responsible
‘regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.’59 O’Keefe’s exhaustive assessment of this
somewhat ambiguous language confirms that the provision creates a truly universal jurisdiction.60
This result undeniably contrasts with the opinions of certain ICJ judges who are openly less
enthused,61 but even if the language contained in the Geneva Conventions is less than clear in this
regard, those responsible for drafting the provision unambiguously intended that ‘the principal of
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universality should be applied here.’62 At least as regards international armed conflict, the notion
of mandatory universal jurisdiction over grave breaches is therefore unavoidable.
By contrast, the existence and scope of a customary equivalent applicable to all categories
of war crimes is less clear. A public interchange between the US State Department and the ICRC
on these issues bears out this proposition in practice. While the US government’s detailed response
to the ICRC’s Customary Study acknowledged that the grave breaches regime creates universal
jurisdiction,63 it retorted that ‘State practice does not support the contention that States, as a matter
of customary international law, have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over the full set of actions defined by the study as ‘war crimes.’’64 As we see from this position,
grave breaches continue to serve an important declaratory function within the modern architecture
of international criminal law—whereas one can question the customary nature of particular
provisions in the laws of war, the explicit codification of the grave breaches regime precludes
serious debate. As powerful states continue to pressure countries like Belgium, Spain and others
to repudiate domestic codifications of universal jurisdiction in years to come, the grave breaches
regime will therefore act as one source of continued resistance.
So for all these reasons, the grave breaches regime appears destined to endure, albeit as
part of an increasingly complex mosaic of law governing war crimes. Only the need for greater
coherence and clarity within and between the various categories of war crimes will lead to the
abolition of grave breaches.

4. Assimilating the Grave Breaches Regime with Other War Crimes
The third possible future is one where the grave breaches regime is assimilated with other
categories of wartime offence to produce a clearer, unified and coherent body of law organized
around principle not history. In essence, this future involves rewriting the law of war crimes afresh.
Changes would be legion. A more systematic taxonomy would avoid the frequent duplication of
war crimes that share identical meanings, such as inhuman treatment and cruel treatment.65 Along
the same lines, a unified law governing war crimes would dispense with antiquated language that
has no bearing on the content of the modern criminal offence, instead of repeating confusing
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phraseology like ‘pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault’.66 But most fundamentally,
a unified law of war crimes would discard unduly complex and morally irrelevant categories of
victimhood (like protected persons status), and part with the discredited divide between
international and non-international armed conflict most commentators condemn as ‘retrograde’.67
War crimes should be organized around their substantive content, not their historical genesis.68
Ideally, a new multilateral treaty will fulfill this function, but this eventuality appears politically
implausible in the short term. The fear that renegotiating the Geneva Conventions in the present
political climate will result in less humanitarian protections than are presently the case, coupled
with the difficulties of amending the ICC Statute, are likely to inhibit the formal codification of
new laws that supersede the grave breaches regime. As a consequence, at least in the near future,
judges will give effect to the commonly-held desires for greater simplicity and coherence in the
law governing war crimes.
Predictably, this will pose problems. One of the most obvious difficulties in leaving courts
to affect legal change within a body of criminal law is that the admirable desire for coherence risks
jeopardizing fair trial rights, especially the prohibition against retroactive criminal law. The law
governing deportation illustrates this tension. As things presently stand, deportation must occur
within occupied territory in order to constitute a grave breach, whereas the equivalent in noninternational armed conflict is limited to ‘ordering the displacement of the civilian population’.69
The distinction is hugely important in practice. As a simplistic illustration, members of the Gestapo
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who forcibly evicted Jews from occupied territories throughout Western Europe perpetrated what
now amounts to a grave breach, but only those political or military leaders who ordered the
displacement could be criminally culpable had the events occurred in a civil war. The illustration
is, of course, facile insofar as it obscures the fact that the two offences came into force
approximately half a century apart—the grave breach of deportation was codified in 1949 whereas
the equivalent in non-international armed conflict was only criminalized for the first time within
the ICC Statute. Thus, it might be safe to conclude that the forcible eviction of civilian populations
from strategic areas adjacent to Vietnam during the US-led carpet bombing of Cambodia was a
grave breach,70 but it is less clear that even ordering displacement during the Biafran civil conflict
within Nigeria at the same time was a war crime. A future that uses jurisprudence to harmonize
these discrepancies is certainly intellectually attractive on one level, but it will also mark a
potentially unconscious and philosophically troubling regression to Nuremberg, where the
principle of nullem crimen sine lege was reduced to a mere ‘principle of justice’.71
In a similar sense, assimilating the grave breaches regime with other categories of war
crime through jurisprudence might lead to a kind of legal stalemate in concrete cases. This is
particularly true of the new practice of dispensing with the qualification of the armed conflict when
the content of the offence is perceived as identical in both contexts.72 Milan Martić, for example,
was convicted of cruel treatment for the injuries sustained by seven members of Croatian Armed
Forces during an indiscriminate rocket attack he launched against the city of Zagreb.73 The Trial
Chamber found that these seven victims were ‘off-duty’,74 and that Martić could therefore be
criminally responsible for injuries they sustained during the attack. Unfortunately, this approach
overlooks the fact that soldiers ‘off duty’ are legitimate targets in one type of conflict but not the
other.75 A terrible impasse arises. In accordance with the new hybrid approach to qualification, the
70
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Martić Trial Chamber reasoned that the offence of ‘cruel treatment’ applies in both types of armed
conflict, then dispensed with the need to qualify the nature of the surrounding hostilities. But
without a determination of armed conflict’s character, it was analytically impossible to determine
which of these competing legal standards applied to the ‘off-duty’ soldiers, and therefore whether
or not the acts in question were criminally reprehensible. The consequences, for both Milan Martić
and international criminal justice, were grave. The former was convicted of a war crime in the face
of irreconcilable legal ambiguity, while the later championed a simpler hybrid conception of armed
conflict without recognizing the potentially sobering consequences. Courts minded to assimilate
war crimes in the future risk reproducing the oversight.
Apart from the threat of wrongful conviction, assimilating war crimes through
jurisprudence also risks infidelity to the underlying law of war. These trends too, have already
manifest in practice. The hybrid approach of conflict qualification, for instance, disregards whether
the conflict is international or otherwise in the name of simplicity, by demanding only that ‘(i) the
armed violence is protracted and (ii) the parties to the conflict are organized’.76 But by requiring
that armed conflicts are protracted, the unified standard imposes an intensity requirement derived
from the definition of non-international armed conflict on the law governing international armed
conflict, even though inter-state warfare has never depended on a similar degree of intensity.77 In
addition, the unified standard also overlooks divergent definitions of non-international armed
conflict. Additional Protocol II explicitly stipulates that organized armed groups must ‘exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol’, and a range of modern courts still insist on
this requirement when dealing with war crimes derived from Additional Protocol II.78 Dispensing
with these types of incongruities is undoubtedly essential for a simpler, more coherent
understanding of war crimes, but achieving this coherence through jurisprudence rather than treaty
leads to a future where international criminal law only approximately comports with the laws of
war upon which they depend.
Interpretative difficulties are, likewise, highly probable in a future where courts harmonize
the various categories of war crimes. Commentators are presently split, for instance, on whether
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universal jurisdiction attaches to war crimes perpetrated within non-international armed conflict.
Some argue that no rule of international law enables universal jurisdiction over war crimes in noninternational armed conflict,79 whereas others assert that states enjoy a discretion to exercise
universal jurisdiction over war crimes perpetrated in non-international armed conflict.80 Neither
position is entirely satisfying. On the one hand, those who deny the right to exercise universal
jurisdiction over war crimes in non-international armed conflict reaffirm a stark disparity between
the criminal regimes governing war crimes in international and non-international armed conflict.
On the other, those who argue for a discretionary right to exercise universal jurisdiction do not go
far enough, since they contradict the mandatory system of universal jurisdiction contained in the
grave breaches regime. The dissonance creates intractable interpretative dilemmas. The ICRC, for
example, stipulates that ‘[s]tates have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over war crimes’,81 tacitly obfuscating the positive duty to exercise universal jurisdiction within
the grave breaches regime. A future that involves incremental assimilation through interpretation
rather than a new negotiated treaty is prone to create more of these sorts of anomalies.
Arguing that the entire grave breaches regime applies in non-international armed conflict
is not likely to improve matters. In a highly influential separate opinion within the Tadić
Jurisdiction Decision, Judge Abi-Saab argued that either a teleological interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions or a new parallel customary rule could render the entire grave breaches
regime applicable in both types of conflict.82 The reasoning laudably embraced the need for
‘rationalisation’ of the law governing war crimes and ‘a modicum of order among the categories
of crimes’.83 As Moir points out in his convincing appraisal of this argument,84 the approach is
intuitively attractive but substantively problematic. Most fundamentally, the reasoning ignores that
several of the grave breaches could not function in non-international armed conflicts. For example,
the grave breach of deportation must originate from occupied territory, which does not exist in
civil wars. Likewise, the grave breach of unlawful confinement is predicated on provisions in the
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Geneva Convention IV allowing administrative detention without trial, but the law governing noninternational armed conflict contains no equivalents. In fact, some grave breaches would be lawful
if perpetrated in a civil war.85 As a result, importing the entire grave breaches regime into noninternational armed conflict would then require courts to decipher which grave breaches could
apply in non-international armed conflict and which could not. In all likelihood, this merely adds
a new layer of analytical complexity to a body of law that already risks serious over-complication.
As a result, this and the other anecdotal examples highlighted, show how achieving coherence
through jurisprudence rather than a treaty is fused with ongoing challenges for the future.

5. Conclusion
During the negotiation of the Geneva Conventions, state representatives unanimously
agreed that ‘the aim was not to produce a penal code.’86 Promulgating a new consolidated treaty
that produces a comprehensive code governing war crimes generally is politically inopportune in
the near future, but the greatest legacy of the grave breaches regime is one where it is viewed as a
bold catalyst for a much more structurally coherent, comprehensive and simply drafted treaty
regime governing war criminality. All other futures are flawed. Abandoning the grave breaches
regime, for example, would lead to loss of certain grave breaches that have no equivalent in other
categories of war crimes, not to mention the fact that discarding the regime entirely leads to the
disappearance of the explicit enforcement obligations that are not paralleled elsewhere. At the
same time, maintaining the status quo also has serious shortcomings—continuing to segregate
grave breaches from other categories of war crimes will result in the decreased application of grave
breaches as prosecutors substitute other offences that cover the same acts more efficiently. Perhaps
more importantly, continued segregation leaves courts to give effect to the widely-held desire for
greater clarity, coherence and simplicity in the law governing war crimes generally.
Commentators, after all, are virtually unanimous that ‘there ought to be no distinction between the
criminality of offenses committed in civil wars and those committed in interstate wars,’87 and there
is also increasing recognition that ‘[i]t makes more sense to categorize the different crimes from a
substantive point of view.’88
At least in theory, jurisprudence could slowly achieve these desires, but allowing courts to
create a new unified law governing war crimes risks violating fair trial rights, creating a body of
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international criminal law that only superficially corresponds with the underlying laws of war, and
distorting understandings of an already overly-complicated discipline. The proliferation of courts
prepared to hear these cases, and the inevitable fragmentation of interpretations risk substantiating
Baxter’s fears that ‘the whole of the law of war … is becoming too complex and too much a
lawyer’s providence.’89 As we have seen, only assimilation of the various categories of war crimes
within a new treaty regime adequately responds to these concerns. And although consolidating the
laws of war within a single new treaty regime might seem politically ambitious, the shift is surely
inevitable over the longer term. Admittedly, civilization has had to undergo tremendous
humanitarian catastrophes in order to achieve regulatory advances of this magnitude in the past,
but perhaps a spirit of frank criticism, open debate and political engagement in this generation
might spare our sons and daughters a future that is as violent as our past.
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